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Abstract—Wireless service providers track the time and loca-
tion of all user connections. Location inference attacks have been
effective in revealing the identity of anonymous users of wireless
services. In this paper, we propose ZipPhone, a solution that
leverages existing cellular infrastructure to improve user privacy.
Spartacus allows a community of users to strategically time their
connections to remain anonymous while incurring a minimal
loss of utility. We evaluate ZipPhone from the perspective of a
cell service provider and a community of privacy-seeking users,
and quantify the privacy/utility trade-off of ZipPhone using two
datasets containing cell tower logs of hundreds of users. We
present and assess a deanonymization algorithm that uses both
location profiling and trajectory linking. We find that by renewing
identifiers every ten minutes and remaining offline for 30 seconds,
users can reduce their identifiability by up to 45%.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are more than 5 billion subscribers to mobile services
worldwide [1]. When these users connect to the Internet, service
providers such as Verizon and Google Fi typically store a log
of the time, radio tower, and user identity associated with the
connection, to manage the network and account for billing [2].
Accordingly, the approximate location of each user over time
is known as well. It has always been necessary for mobile
users to trust their provider with location information because
it is necessary to authenticate to towers for network service.
4G and 5G technologies make use of base stations that are
more densely deployed, each covering a more limited range
than 2G and 3G networks. Therefore, as cellular networks
have advanced, providers have learned with finer resolution
where authenticated users are located. The increased location
specificity not only allows for more accurate pinpointing of a
user’s location, but also makes it easier to identify the user of
a device using location profiling [3] methods; these methods
exploit users’ historical pattern of movement to identify them.
In this paper, we address a fundamental problem between
users and service providers: the user seeks connectivity for a
mobile device, and privacy for their location history, but the
provider requires that users authenticate and pay for service
before a device is connected. Existing methods for increasing
user privacy are generally focused on the network or application
layers, and they do not help users that desire location privacy
from a cellular service provider. For example, VPNs and Tor [4]
mask the IP address of a user from a remote web site, and they
also thwart the cellular operator from learning the IP address of
the remote site; but they do not protect a user from the provider
learning their location or history of movements. Users may also
wish privacy from location based services (LBS), but again,
obfuscation of queries to a remote server does not address
privacy from the mobile operator [5]. A recent class action
lawsuit [6] demonstrates that mobile users desire that cellular
service providers not sell their historic movement records to
third parties, such as location aggregators.
We propose a method called ZipPhone that allows celluar
operators to provide service to authenticated, paid users
without requiring the users to reveal their identity, thereby
protecting their location and history of geographical movements
as well. Our evaluations show that our solution can thwart
location profiling attacks with only a small loss in user
utility, and that power costs are minimal. ZipPhone provides
anonymous authenticated connectivity based on ephemeral
mobile identifiers that thwart linking of movement by one
device. In sum, ZipPhone provides privacy by separating the
purchase of credentials from their use on the network. Further,
ZipPhone can be deployed by mobile network operator (MNO)
(e.g., Verizon) or by a mobile virtual network operator (MVNO)
(e.g., Google Fi). Either way, the user does not need to trust
the MNO or MVNO. ZipPhone makes use of existing 3GPP
standards for roaming and eSIMs; the hurdles required for
deployment are related to the provider’s business model rather
than software or hardware upgrades.
ZipPhone provides users with pseudonymous credentials to
connect to the network. However, this is not enough: users
can reveal their identity by visiting a unique location usch
as their home. Once the credential is compromised, past and
future movements by the user are as well. Moreover, past
work has demonstrated that some users exhibit diurnal and
otherwise predictable movement behaviour [2], and that an
attacker can use location profiling from historical records to
deanonymize users. Users can leverage the well known concept
of mix zones [7] to minimize the consequences of having one
location discovered. With ZipPhone, users switch to a new
identifier regularly enough to naturally form ephemeral mix
zones which can preserve anonymity.
We primarily evaluate an attacker’s ability to identify a
user by using both location profiling and trajectory linking
in combination. We further show that an attacker’s ability to
identify a user depends on the predictability and amount of
mixing in each user’s behaviour; e.g., users who exhibit regular
movement patterns that are distinct from other users are most
easily identifiable. We also quantify the loss of utility for
ZipPhone users defending against such attacks.
Using datasets collected from real users [8, 9], we determine
the privacy gained from small deployments of ZipPhone with
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100–150 users in the same locale using uncoordinated mix
zones. Despite hiding within only a small number of users, we
show that privacy gains are significant, especially for users who
are not unique but are highly predictable; a larger deployment
would increase privacy while maintaining each user’s utility
and performance.
Our contributions are organized as follows.
• We outline the ZipPhone protocol and the fundamental
parameters that affect its privacy in Section III.
• We introduce a sophisticated location privacy attack to
reveal the identity of anonymous cell tower traces. We
probabilistically link traces together to more accurately
identify users using knowledge of users’ historical move-
ment patterns. In Section IV, we discuss this attack and
a strategy to avoid it.
• We evaluate our approach on two data sets collected from
real cellular users [8, 9] in Section V. Predictable, mixing
users are identifiable 24% of the time if they renew their
identifiers every ten minutes, as opposed to 69% if they
use a long-term pseudonym. We quantify the trade off
between the frequency of renewals and user utility. We
find that hourly renewals offer little protection, but that
renewals of about 10 minutes offer significant gains.
• Also in Section V, we estimate the incurred battery use
from ZipPhone for 3G and 4G networks. Specifically, we
measured power consumption during network association
and disassociation, and we estimate that a user may incur
at most 1% battery overhead per day regardless of network
technology or desired privacy if ZipPhone were used.
• In Section VI, we detail the LTE and 5G-compatible
signaling and communications for ZipPhone that allows
anonymous operation via an MNO or MVNO that accepts
cryptocurrency for payment of services.
II. RELATED WORK
In contrast to related work, our goal is to provide mobile
users location privacy from the cellular service provider itself.
Existing work on mobile location privacy has different goals,
including: (i) properly anonymizing mobility datasets before
public release; (ii) adding privacy for users of locations
based services; and (iii) increasing location privacy for mobile
device users from third-party attackers but not the service
provider itself. A number of privacy studies that do assume an
untrustworthy service provider either do not handle location
privacy, or require substantial changes to infrastructure. We
discuss the most relevant of these studies below.
Works that aims to prevent leaks in personally identifiable
information in shared or publicly released datasets [11]
primarily rely on obfuscation. These works also include efforts
to prevent trajectory recovery [12, 13]. Methods like differential
privacy [14, 15] are used to add noise to data while preserving
its aggregate characteristics. Older work on deanonymization of
private traces of mobile users assume the user’s pseudonym is
unchanged throughout the trace. But a small amount of external
information, such as the person’s home or work address [16],
can deanonymize an obfuscated trace [3, 7, 17, 18, 19, 20]
given a consistent identifier. Zang and Bolot [2] show that
suitably anonymizing a trace of 25 million cellular users across
50 states (30 billion records total) requires only that users
have the same pseudonym for no longer than a day. A day’s
duration is unsuitable for Zang and Bolot’s goal of supporting
researchers that wish to characterize the behaviour of users
over time (while maintaining their privacy). On the other hand,
the result is promising for users seeking privacy, who might be
able to change their pseudonyms much more frequently than
once per day.
Work that increases the privacy of location-based services
(LBS) [5, 21, 22, 23] generally add noise to location queries.
These works are not viable or applicable against an untrusted
service provider: a user cannot manipulate which tower they
connect to, and the provider knows the physical locations of
the towers serving users.
Several studies protect against third party attackers and
vulnerabilities in 3GPP implementations [24, 25]. Khan et
al. [26] provide a cryptographic mechanism to generate LTE
pseudonyms and prevent third-party attackers or IMSI catchers
from linking users.
We do not assume that an MNO will deploy any changes
required to add privacy; however, many past works do assume
MNOs will accommodate privacy mechanisms. Some focus on
enlisting a trusted carrier to protect against a third party [27, 28,
29, 30]. Reed et al. [31] propose privacy from the carrier using
onion routing, but does not consider the direct connection that
must be made to a tower. Federrath et al. [32] propose a similar
scheme that prevents linkability of calls between two parties
but omit critical details regarding authentication to the carrier.
Fatemi et al. [33] propose an anonymous scheme for UMTS
using identity-based encryption, but unlike our approach, their
scheme involves the carrier in the cryptographic exchange; they
enumerate the vulnerabilities of similar works [34, 35, 36, 37].
Kesdogan et al. [38] proposes using a trusted third party to
create pseudonyms for GSM users, but also routes all calls
through that provider, which allows it to characterize the calling
pattern and infer the caller.
Mix zones can be employed by a user against a provider
attacker, unlike more recent location privacy techniques which
rely on their cooperation. Our work is closely related to work on
mix zones [17, 39] and abstention from service [40]. Other work
involves the introduction of false information [41, 42]. Few
studies use this concept to protect the user from an omnipresent
network attacker. Chan [43] focuses on call metadata privacy,
rather than location privacy. Emara and Wolfgang [44] use a
mixing scheme to prevent physical trajectory linking.
In comparison to related work, we differ in that we do not
trust the MNO (or MVNO) to ensure the user’s privacy, and
we assume in our analysis that the adversary is attempting
to link together traces. Our evaluations are based on traces
of real users [8, 9], which allows us to quantify the period-
icity of identifier changes in the context of modern cellular
infrastructure.
III. OVERVIEW AND ATTACKER MODEL
Our primary design goal is to provide location privacy for
cellular users from the carrier itself using only mechanisms
that are compatible with deployed MNO and MVNO systems.
In this section, we provide a high-level overview of ZipPhone,
which applies the classic concept of a mix zone [17] to LTE
networks. We then define our attacker model.
A. ZipPhone Overview
ZipPhone users all employ the same protocol, but they do not
coordinate or communicate with one another; it is not a peer-
to-peer system. We refer to mix zones, but users do not trade
or mix IMSIs or other credentials — all IMSIs and credentials
are nonces used once by exactly one user. Furthermore, our
zones are not set up as static geographic areas.
For clarity and generality, we assume ZipPhone is offered
by an MVNO, however, nothing about our design prevents the
MNO itself from offering ZipPhone.
ZipPhone users begin by anonymously paying for and
obtaining eSIM profile credentials from an MVNO before
joining the MNO’s network, a process we detail in Section VI.
The profiles allow the user’s device to join the MNO network
using a short-lived IMSI, MSISDN, and other identifiers.
ZipPhone has the device follow a attach-and-detach cycle.
The attach period always lasts for a minimum duration and
detaching is only an option immediately after a new tower is
attached to. The detach duration is selected at random from
a uniform distribution. The device then reattaches with a new
profile (and IMSI etc.), and the cycle repeats. This algorithm is
defined in Section IV. The user is not involved in the protocol;
the decision of when to detach/re-attach is handled by the
device. The user does not need to alter her movements. If
the device is actively being used, the ZipPhone protocol will
postpone detachment; and if the user were to actively use the
device while detached, it will re-attach immediately. While
attached, the device uses data services to support voice/phone
communication, and all data services must be via an anonymous
communication system. Using the MNO’s network, they can
purchase additional eSIMs from the MVNO if necessary.
The mechanisms for deploying ZipPhone are relatively
straightforward — the challenge for ZipPhone is in understand-
ing its performance guarantees as a function of user behaviour
dynamics. How does the duration of the on-off periods affect
user privacy in the context of attacker strategies? We tackle
this question first, in Sections IV and V. Then, in Section VI,
we present the technical details behind ZipPhone including
required signaling for integration with LTE networks, and the
method used to purchase service anonymously from a provider.
B. Problem Statement
In current LTE systems, a user u is assigned a permanent
IMSI identifier i and joins the network. The user attaches to a
sequence of towers as it moves according to signal strength,
creating a trace associated with the IMSI: (i, (s1, s2, . . .)),
where each value of s indicates a specific tower and a timestamp.
The MNO knows the mapping of users to IMSIs: u : i, etc.
ZipPhone users seek to use the network, but not have their
real identities associated with their traces. The goal of the
attacker is to infer and label their identities from the traces. It
is not the goal of the user to hide that they are using ZipPhone.
We assume the attacker is an MNO that already has a history
of traces for each ZipPhone user. The attacker’s goal is to
determine which user from a set u1, u2, u3, . . . is the one that
created the trace (i, (s1, s2, . . .)) based on a classifier trained
from the known history.
In Section V-B, we demonstrate that longer traces are easier
to identify and link with other traces; users should regularly
renew their identifier in order to keep these traces short. We
assume the user does not perturb their own movement patterns.
Therefore important parameters are (i) the renewal frequency,
and (ii) the offline duration. When the renewal frequency is
higher, privacy also increases; but each renewal incurs an offline
period and increases power usage. Longer offline durations
reduce linking but reduce utility. We assume all such parameters
are public and known to the attacker.
ZipPhone makes use of ephemeral IMSI identifiers managed
in software, instead of permanent IMSI values normally
assigned to SIM cards. This approach is more practical and
effective than several naive solutions. To some extent, users
could repeatedly purchase “burner phones”, but as our results
show, even changing the identifier once every few hours is not
sufficient to thwart an attacker with a historic profile of a user.
C. Attacker Model
We assume the attacker (i) has all traces of all ZipPhone
devices, and (ii) has labelled/identified traces of historic
movement for all ZipPhone users, for training a classifier;
in other words, the attacker is an MNO. The attacker performs
trajectory linking, which patches together separate traces if a
classifier predicts they are from the same user.
We assume that all ZipPhone users are of equal interest to
the attacker, and that it uses only normal cellular infrastructure
to attack. For example, we assume that the MNO attacker
does not install cameras on towers to identify users via facial
recognition, nor would they follow a particular user by car. It
does not make sense for the attacker to set up an IMSI catcher
[45] since they already own the entire real infrastructure.
We assume that the MNO gains no other information from
the users; this is feasible, since advertisement of other identifiers
(e.g. IMEI, device model, or OS signatures) is easily turned
off via OS settings. In practice, such features would assist the
attacker (see [46]), but are not the focus of this paper as they
are more easily obfuscated or falsified than real geographical
movement. For example, IMEIs, which are akin to a MAC
address, can be modified by the user since she controls the
handset hardware (e.g., SilentCircle’s blackphone [47]). Users
are likely identifiable by the unique set of outgoing calls they
make; however, they can make calls via VOIP through an
anonymizing proxy or circuit rather than using the cellular
carrier. Encryption of the VOIP stream can thwart carrier
eavesdropping. Stronger protection is available by using VOIP
over Tor [48].
Algorithm 1 User identifier renewal strategy
1: utility ← Minimum utility between 0.0 and 1.0
2: max off time ← Maximum time offline during renewal
3: while device is online do
4: WAIT(until device moves outside range of tower)
5: DISCONNECT
6: off time ← UNIFORM(0,max off time)
7: WAIT(off time)
8: CONNECT . connect with new identifier
9: cooldown time ← utility × off time
10: WAIT(cooldown time)
Algorithm 2 Location profiling algorithm
1: function PROFILE USER(u) . u is the user index
2: Tu0,q ← Count(q)∑
q′∈C Count(q′)
. The prior for user’s initial
location
3: for all p→ q ∈ TRANSITIONS(u) do . p→ q
denotes a transition
4: Tup,q ← Count(p→q)∑
q′∈C Count(p→q′) . This transition
matrix may be sparse
5: return Tu
6: function CLASSIFY USER(s) . s = (s0, s1 . . . ), s ∈ C is
a sequence of tower IDs
7: return argmaxu Tu0,s0
∏n−2
i=0 T
u
si,si+1
IV. ATTACKER-DEFENDER DYNAMICS
In this section, we define the exact algorithms used by the
ZipPhone user and the MNO-based attacker.
A. User strategy
Algorithm 1 defines the ZipPhone user algorithm. As
described in the previous section, ZipPhone users renew their
identifiers when: (i) they are in the process of switching towers,
and (ii) the renewal cool down period (in seconds) has expired;
(iii) they are not actively using the phone. To renew, users
first detach, then stay offline, and then reattach with a new
profile. The offline time is selected uniformly at random from
a maximum offline period (our evaluations set the maximum
to 30s). It must be random, otherwise linking traces would be
trivial. The cool down period ensures that utility remains at
a minimum for the user. This aggressive renewal strategy is
frequent enough to allow the natural formation of mix zones,
and does not require users to coordinate times or places to
mix.
B. Attacker strategies
The attacker’s goal is to take a timestamped sequence of
visited towers and infer the user, given a training set. We first
describe a location profiling classifier (Algorithm 2) that could
be employed by the attacker. We then define a trajectory linking
classifier (Algorithm 3) to aid the attacker in location profiling.
1) Location profiling algorithm: Our classifier is a Markov
model that chooses the most likely user for a sequence of tower
attaches; the classifier is adapted from Mulder et al. [3]. Vector
s is a sequence of IDs in tower set C: s = (s0, s1, s2 . . . ), s ∈
C. In the steps below, the attacker identifies the most probable
user given each candidate user’s history, uˆ = argmaxu p(u|s).
We determine the most likely user, given a sequence of
locations.
Pr(u|s) = Pr(u|s0, s1, s2, . . . )
We apply Bayes’ rule, and consider the likelihood of a sequence
given a user.
Pr(u|s) = Pr(s0, s1, s2, . . . |u) Pr(u)
Pr(s0, s1, s2, . . . )
We assume that each user is equally likely.
Pr(u|s) ∝ Pr(s0, s1, s2, . . . |u)
= Pr(s0|u) · Pr(s1|u, s0) · Pr(s2|u, s0, s1)·
Pr(s3|u, s0, s1, s2) . . .
Each transition is independent per the Markov assumption.
= Pr(s0|u)
n∏
i=0
Pr(si+1|si, u)
We determine the most likely user uˆ.
uˆ = argmax
u
Pr(s0|u)
n∏
i=0
Pr(si+1|si, u)
The attacker computes a transition matrix T for each user in
the training data by counting the occurrences of these transitions
in history. The probability of the first location in the sequence
Pr(s0|u) is computed from the overall number of a user’s
occurrence at a location. The attacker does not consider the
probability of a trace ending at a certain location, since a
sequence can end for arbitrary reasons.
The success of such an attack depends on two factors: the
number of users in the same vicinity as the anonymous target,
and the similarity of the user’s location trajectory to those of
the surrounding users. If there is one registered cell phone
user on the network, then linking the user to location is trivial;
however, if there are many users who behave similarly, it would
be difficult for the attacker to tell the user apart.
(We also defined and tested a classifier that added diurnal
features but it did not perform significantly better.)
2) Trajectory linking algorithm: We extend the above
algorithm to account for the attacker’s ability to do this linking.
The attacker uses the publicly available offline time to inform
a semi-Markov linking transition matrix. This is similar to the
user transition matrices above, except it is time-limited to the
offline time, so that unreasonable transitions do not confuse
the classifier, and any unseen transitions occurring within that
time frame are accounted for.
Our trajectory linking algorithm first searches for candidate
traces that start within the maximum offline time. If a sufficient
number of traces start within the offline time, the targets have
a chance to mix, thus reducing the attacker’s likelihood of
classifying and increasing their privacy. However, the attacker
may still infer the links between several traces using the linking
transition matrix, and attempt to classify the resulting longer
Algorithm 3 Linking algorithm
1: max t ← Maximum time offline during renewal
2: function TRAIN LINK TRANSITIONS
3: for all p max t−−−→ q do . all locations q seen within
max t of p
4: T lp,q ← Count(p
max t−−−→q)∑
q′∈C Count(p
max t−−−→q′) . transition matrix
used for linking
5: return T l
6: function CLASSIFY USER WITH TRAJECTORY(s)
7: while link count<max links do
8: candidates ←FIND CANDIDATES(s) . traces ≤
max off time after s ends
9: if EMPTY(candidates) then
10: break
11: sˆ′ ← argmaxs′ T lsn,s′0 . ∀s
′ ∈ candidates
12: s← CONCATENATE(s,s′)
13: return CLASSIFY USER(s)
trace. Algorithm 3 extends the location profiling to include
these attempts to link.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 using
two real-world datasets that contain geotagged user data
coupled with tower attachment logs: PhoneLab [9] and
RealityMining [8]. Our datasets are, thus, similar to what would
be available to an MNO attacker. In particular, we evaluated the
amount of privacy a user could attain given certain sacrifices
in utility.
Before evaluating our algorithms, we characterize the amount
of predictability and mixing behaviour exhibited by users in
these datasets. We demonstrate that both characteristics are
related to the success of the attacker’s accuracy.
1) Datasets: Both datasets were collected primarily from
university affiliates who carried phones instrumented with
software to log phone network attachment and activity.
1) PhoneLab [9] is an Android testbed comprising 593
phones distributed to students at the University of Buffalo
campus. As a part of this testbed, users contributed
geotagged traces of their cellular network associations.
We use 24 months from January 2015 to January 2017
of cellular network association traces from PhoneLab to
assess the privacy preservation potential of ZipPhone.
2) RealityMining [8] is a dataset released by MIT that
tracks a group of 100 mobile phone users across various
contexts. Similar to PhoneLab, RealityMining contains
geotagged network association information. For our
analysis, we leverage 12 months of RealityMining data
from July 2004 to July 2005.
We are unaware of other datasets that could be used to analyze
our algorithms. (We filed IRB protocol 2017-3900 as part of
this project, and it was approved as exempt.)
Type Trait Privacyhypothesis PhoneLab
Reality
MiningPredictable Mixing
P/M Yes Yes Moderate-Low 18% 18%
nP/M Yes No Low 26% 30%
P/nM No Yes High 30% 24%
nP/nM No No Moderate 26% 29%
Fig. 1. User typology and their proportions in our target datasets, with a
hypothesis about the amount of privacy a user could attain from ZipPhone.
A. Behaviour that affects attacker accuracy
We begin by characterizing user behaviour. Intuitively, there
are two behavioural traits that affect mobile users’ privacy:
(i) Predictability, or to what extent users travel over fixed
routes; and (ii) Mixing behaviour, or how likely are users
to visit popular locations that see a large volume of other
ZipPhone users. To highlight the effect of user behaviour on
privacy, we categorized PhoneLab and RealityMining users
post hoc into four groups: predictable or unpredictable; and
mixing or not. The four resulting user types are described in
Figure 1, where we also set forth a hypothesis of how user
behaviour would affect privacy. We verify and confirm these
hypothesis in our evaluation (Section V).
1) Predictability: We calculate the user predictability in
terms of the similarity of the set of cellphone towers they
visited during the testing and training period. For each user,
let Cpre be the set of towers visited during the training phase
and Cpost be the set of towers visited in the testing phase. We
express the predictability in terms of a user’s Jaccard similarity
score Cpre and Cpost, defined as JC =
Cpre∩Cpost
Cpre∪Cpost , where
0 ≤ JC ≤ 1. JC = 0 when the sets of visited towers in testing
and training are completely disjoint, while JC = 1 means that
the sets of visited towers in testing and training are the same.
Intuitively, a higher JC means a more predictable trajectory.
Figure 2 (left) presents the attacker’s accuracy (i.e., the
probability that a user would be identified) as a function of
the users’ Jaccard score in the PhoneLab dataset. We note
that the trends and respective thresholds are similar for the
RealityMining dataset and omit these results due to space
limitations. For this setup, 91% of users fall within the 0.0–0.4
Jaccard score range. For these users, we see an increasing trend
in the attacker’s accuracy as the Jaccard score grows. Using
this analysis of our test dataset, we set the Jaccard score to 0.1
as a cut off to differentiate between predictable users (such
with JC > 0.1) and unpredictable users (such with JC ≤ 0.1).
2) Mixing behaviour: We establish a mixing score MC as
a metric that evaluates a user’s likelihood to mix with other
ZipPhone users. Intuitively, the higher the mixing score, the
more efficient ID switching will be and the harder it will be
for the adversary to evade a user’s privacy. We calculate MC
for each individual user. Let tki be the time a user i ∈ (1, N)
spends at tower k ∈ (1,K). During the period tki , other users
j ∈ (1, N ′), j 6= i,N ′ ⊂ N , may arrive and depart from tower
k. Let τkij be the time of user j’s arrival or departure. Intuitively,
tki and τ
k
ij define the temporal granularity of tower mobility
and ZipPhone user encounter events, respectively, from the
perspective of a single user i. Let C(τkij) be the number of
Fig. 2. Left: User predictability versus attacker accuracy, showing that attacker
accuracy is near zero with low predictability. Right: User mixing versus
attacker accuracy, showing that median accuracy falls to zero as user mixing
increases. The plots were computed from the PhoneLab dataset. The presented
results are for a maximum offline time period of 30 seconds and a set utility
of 95%. Utility and accuracy metrics are discussed in detail in Section V-B.
users in user i’s vicinity at time τkij . We define the mixing
score as:
MC =
K∑
k=1
N ′∑
j=1
C(τkij)
τkij − τki(j−1)
(1)
Figure 2 (right) presents the attacker’s accuracy as a function
of the users’ mixing score in the PhoneLab dataset. The trends
and respective thresholds are similar for the RealityMining
dataset. We see that the attacker’s accuracy deteriorates as the
users’ mixing score increases. Based on this analysis, we set a
mixing score of 4 as the cutoff to determine whether a user is
mixing or not mixing, i.e. users with MC ≤ 4 are not mixing
and these with MC > 4 are mixing.
User typology in our datasets. As detailed earlier, we differ-
entiate between four types of users based on their predictability
and mixing behaviour. Using the presented analysis in Figure 2,
we set a Jaccard similarity threshold of 0.1 and mixing score
threshold of 4. Figure 1 presents the amount of users that
fall in each user type category. We see a relatively even user
representation across all categories. We use these user types
and the corresponding user populations in all results presented
in the evaluation of ZipPhone (Section V).
B. Results
To determine the affect of ZipPhone on the utility and privacy
of users, we simulated the protocol using the PhoneLab and
RealityMining datasets. In these simulations, the attacker uses
the inference algorithms outlined in Section IV-B to develop a
location profile for each user based on two months of training
data, and labels anonymous traces in the next month.
1) Utility-privacy trade-off: We evaluated the utility-privacy
tension with regard to the four user types. We quantify privacy
gained in terms of reduced attacker accuracy. We measured
loss of utility in terms of time spent offline during the testing
period. Figure 3 displays the privacy gained by each user group
during the one-month testing periods.
Users gained significant privacy from sacrificing 5% utility,
on average remaining online for 9.5 minutes, and going offline
for 30 seconds. In particular, Type P/M (predictable but mixing
users) gained 45% in the PhoneLab dataset, and 49% in the
RealityMining dataset. Interestingly, Types nP/M and P/nM
Fig. 3. Left: PhoneLab. Right: RealityMining. In both datasets, predictable
but mixing users (Type P/M) gain the most from using ZipPhone. Ten test
traces were evaluated per user, and accuracy is represented as a mean of the
proportion of successful reidentifications per user. Error bars represent a 95%
confidence interval.
Fig. 4. Left: PhoneLab. Right: RealityMining. Users lose a significant
amount of privacy when traces are on the order of one day long. The accuracy
at one month is equivalent to the accuracy in Figure 3 at 100% utility.
also show a similar trend: Type nP/M benefits from having
the divided traces be less predictable, and for Type P/nM any
small amount of predictability is reduced to none. Type nP/nM
does not mix, and enjoys uniformly high privacy because they
are unpredictable. Users were more private in general in the
PhoneLab, since it represented a larger community of users,
making mixing easier for the user, and user inference more
difficult for the attacker.
2) Trace length and location profiling: The main driver of
attacker accuracy is trace length. In these experiments, the
attacker tries to identify an independent trace of varying length.
Figure 4 shows the result.
In general, the longer the trace, the more identifiable (and
thus less private) an individual is. Users who exhibit more
predictable behaviour have less privacy; generally, they benefit
from traces that are at most one hour long. In other words,
predictable users should change their identifier at least once per
hour while in motion. Those who travel to unique locations as
compared to others benefit significantly less from the shorter
trace.
This result highlights the benefit of ZipPhone. Users should
change their identifiers more than once per hour, and this
system obviates the need to physically change an identifier,
and handles this process automatically. While a temporary
SIM device may grant some measure of privacy, a system that
renews a user’s identifier a lot more quickly can be a lot more
effective.
3) Compromises in utility: While users may renew identifiers
by prearranging mixing strategies with other users, such
coordination is impractical. A frequent enough renewal strategy
and long enough renewal times allow mix-zones naturally
Fig. 5. Left: the effect of mixing-time on privacy while maintaining a 95%
utility for the PhoneLab dataset. Right: privacy/utility of all users depending
on whether their priority is privacy, phone calls, or screen use. Calls can be
prioritized without sacrificing privacy. However, remaining online while the
screen is on significantly reduces privacy.
form which allow users to mix without any coordination. In
Figure 5 (left), we examine the amount of time a user should
remain offline. The frequency of renewal is informed by the
utility desired, which we set at 95%.
For users to gain privacy during identifier renewal, they
must remain offline long enough to mix with other users.
Additionally, users must not have a fixed offline time, since
this would be susceptible to a timing attack. Users must choose
an offline time that is not so long to be disruptive, but not
so short as to offer little privacy. The ZipPhone population’s
policy should fix a chosen utility, and employ a cool down time
between each user’s identifier renewal based on that desired
utility. For example, if users’ offline-times are 30 seconds,
and are aiming to maintain 95% utility, they will keep every
identity for at least 30 seconds÷ (1− 0.95) =10 minutes.
Looking further at the PhoneLab data, we discovered that
phone calls were intermittent and could be kept online without
sacrificing privacy, though users would miss 4 calls out of 24
per month on average at 95% utility. However, as we show in
Figure 5 (right), users cannot remain online during all of their
reported interactive time without sacrificing additional privacy.
Finally, applications that require a persistent connection to the
Internet could not be used without disruption.
C. Battery Overhead
ZipPhone triggers periodic disassociation/association from
the mobile carrier, which together incur additional battery draw
on the mobile device. Thus, in this section, we quantify the
battery overhead incurred by ZipPhone on 3G and 4G networks.
Experimental setup. In order to evaluate the power con-
sumption of mobile network association/disassociation, we used
a Samsung Galaxy S5 Duos phone with a bypassed battery
and a Google Fi SIM card, and a Monsoon Power Meter. We
connected the phone to the main channel of the power meter,
as illustrated in Figure 6, which allowed us to both power up
the phone and measure its energy consumption. In order to
measure the power draw at 3G and 4G networks, we forced
the phone to the respective technology and sampled the power
draw at a granularty of 200µs. We used the phone’s Settings
screen to toggle between Airplane Mode OFF and Airplane
Mode ON every 10 seconds for 4G and every 20 seconds
for 3G. We disabled all background services on the phone.
Fig. 6. Experimental setup for power measurements on 3G and 4G networks.
Fig. 7. Battery usage does not exceed 1% per day, regardless of desired
privacy or network type.
This ensured that we are only measuring the power draw from
association/disassociation, plus a baseline of about 700mW
used by the display for the Airplane Settings page. For each
of 3G and 4G we completed 10 full association/disassociation
cycles. The average experienced time and power to connect
inform our simulaiton results.
Figure 8 presents a zoomed version of a single asso-
ciate/disassociate cycle for 3G (left) and 4G (right)1. There
are several important points to note on each trace. First,
the red vertical line indicates the phone’s transition from
Airplane Mode ON to OFF state, which immediately triggers a
network association. After the association procedure completes,
the phone enters FACH (Forward Access CHannel) state in
anticipation for the user to begin accessing the Internet. Since
this does not happen in our controlled activity, the phone
futher transitions into IDLE state. At the instant designated
with a green vertical line, we toggle Airplane Mode ON, which
immediately triggers a disassociation procedure.
A ZipPhone user would experience two types of overhead:
(i) offline time, and (ii) power draw. We measure the offline
time as the time between the beginning of network association
and the beginning of the FACH state. We measure the power
overhead as the sum of power to associate and power to
disassociate, whereby the power to associate is incurred from
the begining of the network association to the beginning of the
FACH state, while the power to disassociate is measured from
the beginning till the end of the disassociation procedure.
1Note that the timescale (i.e. the x-axis range) for 3G is longer than that
for 4G, because on 3G the phone takes significantly longer to transition to
IDLE mode compared to 4G.
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Fig. 8. Power trace for 3G (left) and 4G (right) association and disassociation.
mean (std dev)
3G
Power to connect (mW) 2,098 (435)
Power to disconnect (mW) 1,282 (157)
Time to connect (s) 5.0 (0.8)
Time to disconnect (s) 4.0 (1.0)
4G
Power to connect (mW) 2,006 (171)
Power to disconnect (mW) 1,120 (295)
Time to connect (s) 2.6 (0.2)
Time to disconnect (s) 3.0 (1.2)
Fig. 9. Time and power overhead incurred by a single association/disassociation
procedure on 3G and 4G in our experiments.
Figure 9 presents the average incurred overhead for our
measurement campaign. We see that the offline time incurred
by 3G is nearly double that of 4G. The power consumption,
on another hand, is comparable across the two technologies.
We use these results to quantify the battery usage per day for
users in our datasets. To this end, we convert the measured
power consumption for a single connect/disconnect from mW
to mWh using the values in Figure 9. We assume a 3.85V
battery with a capacity of 2800mAh, which is typical. On the
x-axis we control the desired user utility from 0.8 to 1, which
effectively controls the amount of network disconnect/connect
cycles a user will incur for the duration of a day. We multiply
that number by the energy consumption (in mWh) and then
divide by the battery’s capacity to determine what fraction of
the battery is consumed due to ZipPhone. Figure 7 presents
our results, which indicate that the battery usage is at most
1% per day regardless of technology (3G or 4G) or desired
privacy.
VI. PROVISIONING, PURCHASE, AND COMMUNICATION
In this section, we detail how recently standardized mech-
anisms for user provisioning and authentication allow for
ZipPhone to be deployed by an untrusted MNO or MVNO.
A. Mobile user provisioning and authentication
Traditionally, SIM cards installed in devices provide the basis
of MNO provisioning. Each SIM has a unique International
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI). At the Home Location
Registry (HLR) an entry is created connecting the IMSI with
an Mobile Station International Subscriber Directory Number
(MSISDN; i.e., a phone number). At the Authentication Center
(AuC) the IMSI is paired with a Ki value and used for user
authentication.
This approach is plagued with high overhead, wasted
allocations, and manual processes. To address these limitations,
the eSIMs standard [49] has been developed, which allows
programmatic and on-the-fly provisioning of a user’s identity
on a network. With eSIMs, mobile users can maintain multiple
simultaneous mobile network identities and use heterogeneous
services from one or multiple MNOs. Three out of the four
major carriers in the US currently support eSIM, with one major
carrier supporting eSIM in 42 other countries worldwide [50].
eSIMs introduce new components to user management that
are useful for ZipPhone. Similar to traditional SIMs, the eSIM
functional profile [51] is jointly maintained in the MNO’s HLR
and the AuC. The Subscription Manager Data Preparation
(SM-DP+), is responsible for provisioning a user’s profile onto
the eSIM. The SM-DP+ is the first point of communication
between an aspiring subscriber and the MNO, from which
the subscriber gets their functional profile. There is no upper
limit on the amount of profiles an eSIM can maintain; this
number depends on (i) the size of a single profile, (ii) the eSIM
integrated memory and, (iii) the operator’s preferences. As an
example, T-Mobile currently supports up to 10 concurrent eSIM
Profiles [52].
Thus, ZipPhone can be deployed as an app that anony-
mously acquires multiple profiles from a provider’s SM-DP+
and programmatically swaps them in order to improve the
subscriber’s privacy. Note that this operation leverages the
existing MNO mechanisms and, thus does not assume or require
any cooperation from the MNO.
B. Purchasing Credentials
ZipPhone requires that users anonymously purchase profiles
without linking to a consistent financial or network identifier.
Zcash [53, 54] offers a basis for such purchases as follows. The
MVNO advertises a Zcash address for purchasing credentials
and a price per purchased profile. The user creates a public-
private key pair, and issues a transaction that transfers the
purchase amount to the MVNO, and includes its own public
key as part of the transaction (which could be encrypted with
the public key of MVNO’s address for greater security). The
MVNO responds with a data only transaction that includes
the set of credentials, encrypted with the provided public
key. This exchange must occur separately for each credential
purchased, each with a different public key and each from a
different Zcash source address, so that a series of purchases
cannot be linked as belonging to the same user. These
requirements are easy to provide with Zcash and can be
performed programmatically. There is an effort to deploy
Zcash’s zero-knowledge mechanisms on Ethereum as well.
The user’s transactions should not be overtly issued from the
same IP address, as that would allow linking of the purchases.
Protocols such as Dandelion++ [55] allow transactions to be
issued to Zcash with network anonymity.
A ZipPhone users would carry a series of pre-purchased
profiles, and use them in a random order. MVNO should issue
signaling to the MNO to cancel the IMSI a period of time
after they are first used (e.g., 15–30 minutes) .
C. Communication without Leaking Identity or Location
ZipPhone uses should ignore the MSISDN (phone numbers)
provided by a profile. If a ZipPhone user initiated or received
overt LTE or unencrypted VOIP calls, they risk being identified
via a profile of call records held by the carrier. expect to retain
location privacy. (Note that E911 service, which is tied to a
handset and not a user or SIM, would be still available if
needed.)
Some protection would be gained from using an encrypted
VOIP service, since it would not reveal to the carrier the
identity of the user’s contact, whom she calls, or from whom
she receives calls. However, if the IP address of the VOIP
service is unique, then connecting to it would help the MNO
link a collection of profiles together. An anonymous VOIP
service, such as Torfone can be used; note that anonymous
VOIP has a performance penalty [56].
In general, an anonymous communication systems, i.e., Tor,
must be used for all ZipPhone communication (voice or data).
However, there is one change required. Tor chooses a consistent,
single guard relay to start all three-relay circuits through the Tor
network. If ZipPhone users send all traffic to a single guard
relays, it would be a consistent identifier despite changing
IMSIs. Instead of a guard at the start of the circuit, ZipPhone
users should use a consistent relay as the exit. This switching
of roles allows ZipPhone users to receive all protections against
the Predecessor Attack [57] that Tor normally provides via
guard nodes at the entry.
VII. DISCUSSION
1) Limitations: Our technique has limitations. We require
devices that accept software SIMs; these are not common
in the marketplace now, though easy to provide. Another
limitation is that users would never be able to quantify their
privacy gains as there is no way to determine the number of
other ZipPhone users. And we do not address other privacy
risks, which include physical attacks (e.g., radio frequency
fingerprinting [58]), software vulnerabilities, use of location-
based services, advertising fingerprints, browser cookies, and
malware.
Our evaluations are limited as well. For example, we do not
explicitly consider users ready to mix when they are stationary;
if they do, attackers could also consider these additional mixes
when linking. A more advanced attacker’s classifier might
account for yet additional features (e.g., time of day or favourite
locations [2]) to increase accuracy. Conversely, users could
develop more efficacious methods to prevent linking. And our
results are tied to our datasets, which are relatively small and
limited to populations from universities. Obtaining a usable
dataset is difficult. MNOs are generally unwilling to anonymize
and share such data, and collecting data requires a fairly
involved longitudinal study.
Despite these limitations, this paper introduces an effective
method for a service provider to put location privacy in the
hands of users, and provides a detailed look at the efficacy of
such a service.
2) Ethical implications: Mobile devices are an essential
part of most people’s daily routine. Accordingly, there is a
tension between the right to location privacy and the need to
investigate crimes and threats to public safety. The techniques
we introduce and evaluate are effective to protecting privacy, but
unfortunately would thwart a common method of investigation
as well. Any deployment of ZipPhone would have to take into
account this difficult, zero-sum game ethical dilemma.
VIII. CONCLUSION
ZipPhone is a novel protocol that provides users increased
location privacy while using the existing centralized cellular
infrastructure. We evaluated a deanonymization attack that uses
a combination of location profiling and trajectory linking, and
showed that it is effective in identifying long-term pseudonyms.
Using two separate datasets of call detail records, we then
demonstrated that a ZipPhone user can defend against such
attacks by renewing her identifier regularly. We also evaluated
the utility cost in terms of time offline and battery life, and
showed it to be minimal.
Our work demonstrates that, fundamentally, users do not
need to trust wireless service providers with their location
information. Users who do not use any anonymization scheme
are always identifiable. In our trace-driven evaluations, a non-
ZipPhone user who is habitual and conventional (predictable
and mixing) who renews her pseudonym monthly is identifiable
69% of the time, and one who uses ZipPhone is identifiable 24%
of the time if she sacrifices 5% of her utility and 1% of battery
life, towards a lower bound of 19% if she sacrifices more. In
other words, users can significantly reduce their identifiability
by up to 45% by renewing their pseudonym after an offline
period of 30 seconds every ten minutes.
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